Unifying Decision-Making: a Review on Evolutionary Theories on
  Rationality and Cognitive Biases by Moreira, Catarina
Unifying Decision-Making: a Review on Evolutionary
Theories on Rationality and Cognitive Biases
Catarina Moreira
School of Business, University of Leicester
University Road, LE1 7RH Leicester, United Kingdom
cam74@le.ac.uk
Abstract. In this paper, we make a review on the concepts of rationality across several differ-
ent fields, namely in economics, psychology and evolutionary biology and behavioural ecology.
We review how processes like natural selection can help us understand the evolution of cogni-
tion and how cognitive biases might be a consequence of this natural selection. In the end we
argue that humans are not irrational, but rather rationally bounded and we complement the
discussion on how quantum cognitive models can contribute for the modelling and prediction
of human paradoxical decisions.
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1 Introduction
Rationality is one of the oldest and yet still on going research topics in the scientific community.
Specially in the modern world where computational tools are used for predictive analyses of human
behaviour and for the development of more sophisticated decision-making models that are able to
contribute for a general theory for decision-making. Rationality is a term that has been widely
debated across several fields of the literature with different discussions in Economics, Psychology and
behavioural Ecology / evolutionary Biology.
In 1944, the Expected Utility theory was axiomatised by the mathematician John von Neumann
and the economist Oskar Morgenstern, and became one of the most significant and predominant
rational theories of decision-making (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953). The Expected Utility
Hypothesis is characterised by a specific set of axioms that enable the computation of the person’s
preferences with regard to choices under risk (Friedman and Savage, 1952). By risk, we mean an
uncertain event that can be measured and quantified. In other words, choices based on objective
probabilities. Under this theory, human behaviour is assumed to maximise an utility function and
by doing so, the person would be acting in a fully rational setting. This means that human psy-
chological processes started to be irrelevant as long as human decision-making obeys to some set of
axioms (Glimcher and Fehr, 2014).
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In 1953, Allais proposed an experiment that showed that human behaviour does not follow these
normative rules and violates the axioms of Expected Utility, leading to the well known Allais para-
dox (Allais, 1953). Later, in 1954, the mathematician Leonard Savage proposed an extension of the
Expected Utility hypothesis, giving origin to the Subjective Expected Utility (Savage, 1954). Instead
of dealing with decisions under risk, the Subjective Utility theory deals with uncertainty. Uncertainty
usually described situations that involve ambiguous / unknown information. Consequently, it is spec-
ified by subjective probabilities. In 1961, Daniel Ellsberg proposed an experiment that showed that
human behaviour also contradicts and violates the axioms of the Subjective Expected Utility theory,
leading to the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961). In the end, the Ellsberg and Allais paradoxes show
that human behaviour does not follow a normative theory and, consequently, tends to violate the
axioms of rational decision theories. In summary, when dealing with preferences under uncertainty,
it seems that models based on normative theories of rational choice tend to tell how individuals must
choose, instead of telling how they actually choose (Machina, 2009).
The separation of economics from psychology made these two research fields take their own
separate paths in terms of human decision-making. In one extreme, economics was built up from a
set of strong normative assumptions that assume that to be fully rational means to obey to some
set of axioms. Everything that is not chosen according to these normative axioms lead to irrational
behaviour.
In this paper, we will put together some major scientific contributions from different fields that
could help to unify interdisciplinary knowledge towards a more unified decision model.
2 The Different Types of Rationality
The psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer makes a distinction between the degrees of rationality that a theory
of decision-making should incorporate (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001). Disciplines like Economics,
Cognitive Science, Biology, etc, assume that both humans and animals have unlimited information,
unlimited computational power and unlimited time to make a decision. And consequently, as long
as these decisions follow the axioms of the expected utility theory, then they are optimal and fully
rational. This kind of rationality is called unbounded rationality. Figure 1 shows the different kinds of
rationality that one can find across different disciplines as proposed by Gigerenzer and Selten (2001).
Figure 1, makes a distinction between two unconstrained theories of rationality: the unbounded
rationality and the optimisation under constraints. The difference is that the later has a stopping
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rule, which measures and stops at the point where the cost for further search exceeds the benefits of
the decision.
Fig. 1. Different types of rationality accross different fields as suggested in the work of Gigerenzer and Selten
(2001).
Although unbounded rationality is widely used across several fields (specially in Economics), it
is not a concept that can be applied in real world decision scenarios. Both humans and animals have
limited resources: they need to make inferences under uncertain aspects of the world with limited
knowledge, limited computational power and limited time. For instance, an animal that is exposed
in the wild looking for food needs to make the decision if it will either remain looking for food being
completely exposed to his predators or if he should hide. If he has unlimited time to make this decision,
this could evolve the computation of several alternatives in order to choose the one that grants the
animal the highest utility. However, if the animal looses too much time in this reasoning process, he
could get attacked by its predators. So, there are constraints on resources when making decisions
under uncertainty. One can even argue that both humans and animals are fully rational under these
constraints: we try to find the best option with the limited time, computational power and information
that we have. This is usually called bounded rationality and usually incorporates heuristics (or rules
of thumb) which are gathered by experience and memory in order to turn the decision process faster.
Bounded rationality was a term introduced by Simon (1955) where he suggested that decision-makers
are seen as satisficers, who seek a solution that is satisfiable under constraints in time, information
and computation, rather than the optimal one.
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3 Biological System: Does Natural Selection Produce Rational
Behaviour?
In evolutionary Biology, the fitness of an individual is a measure how good an individual (or a species)
is at leaving offsprings in the next generation. This is a very important concept, since natural selection
consists on the heritable variations that a trait can suffer and consequently influence the fitness level
of an individual (Stevens, 2008). The premise is that, the more surviving descendants an individual
produces, the higher is the fitness level.
Since natural selection is the process by which biological evolution occurs, leading to a species
with more fitness, many scholars have posed the question whether natural selection has any role in
rational behaviour (Stevens, 2008; Houston et al., 2007; Santos and Rosati, 2015).
Like humans, animals also need to make decisions that grants them higher profits. In other words,
they need to take into account temporal delays and uncertainty as well as potential payoffs in pursuing
different actions (Santos and Rosati, 2015). In this sense, human decisions under economic scenarios
can have some analogies with the type of decisions that animals are faced when they are foraging for
food or seeking mates: in both scenarios it is assumed that they prefer choices that grant them higher
profits / food / fitness levels. The question that arises in this context is if, under an evolutionary
point of view, natural selection leads to choices that are in accordance with the expected utility
hypothesis, then how did human biases emerge?
One of the cognitive biases pointed in Tversky and Kahneman (1986) work is the framing effect.
In framing effects, people react differently to some choice depending on how that choice is presented.
For instance, people tend to avoid risk when a positive frame is presented but seek risks when a
negative frame is presented (Kahneman et al., 1982). Research shows that these framing effects are
not singular to humans, but they also occur in primates. For instance, Chen et al. (2006) made an
experiment where monkeys could trade tokens with human experimenters in exchange for food. In
the end, the amount of food that each monkey received form the human experimenters was the same.
The difference was that one experimenter showed the monkey one piece of apple and then added
an extra one (the gains experimenter), while the other showed two pieces of apple to the monkey,
but removed one (the losses experimenter). Although the monkeys received the same payoff, they
preferred the gains experimenter over the losses one, indicating that monkeys also fall under the
framing effect like humans (Santos and Rosati, 2015).
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Another study with monkeys conducted by (Lakshminarayanan et al., 2011) showed that monkeys
also revealed a reflection effect. The reflection effect explains that we have opposite ’risk preferences’
for uncertain choices, depending on whether the outcomes is a possible gain or a loss. In the study
of (Lakshminarayanan et al., 2011), monkeys tended to seek out more risk when dealing with losses
when compared to gains.
These works suggest that cognitive biases are not singular to humans, but they occur in non-
human beings as well. These findings could imply some ancestral roots in our cognitive system.
Returning to the question of whether natural selection plays a role in a fully rational cognitive
system, studies suggest that it is not the case (Stevens, 2008). Natural selection does play a role in
optimising the fitness of an individual, like it is stated in the work of (Santos and Rosati, 2015). If
the environment is constant, then the process of natural selection of a species reaches its optimal
fitness with time. It seems that context does play an important role in natural selection.
Following the discussion on (Santos and Rosati, 2015), in evolutionary biology it is agreed that
it may be rational for an individual to make biased and inconsistent preferences, if these preferences
point towards the maximisation of the fitness (Kacelnik, 2006). In other words, individuals my be
acting rational by falling into cognitive biases that may lead them to the survival of the species. This
can be connected with the notion of bounded rationality that it was presented in the previous section.
These cognitive biases produce rules of thumb for individuals that, although they are not optimal,
they lead to the best possible decision given the limited constraints on time, computational power
and information. In other words, they are able to reach a decision that grants them a high return
(not the most optimal one), using less computational resources through the usage of heuristics. Note
that, the notion of heuristic consists precisely in a shortcut that usually leads to the desired outcome,
but sometimes and get lead to wrong decisions and outcomes (Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008).
Experiments conducted on birds also show the importance of context in behavioural ecology.
Studies have shown that both birds and insects deviate significantly from their choices when the
context varies (Kacelnik and Marsh, 2002). Following the arguments in (Santos and Rosati, 2015),
in behavioural ecology, the energetic increase of an individuals fitness level is non-linear. This means
that a single unit of food has a significant impact on an individual that has a low level of energy
(an individual that is hungry), but it would have a lower impact (or even a negative impact) on an
individual that is already in a high energy state (not hungry). So, the risk preferences that both
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humans and animals choose in different contexts might be optimising the fitness measure under a
biological point of view depending on the context where they are.
Summarising, natural selection alone does not lead to optimal rational and cognitive behaviour,
but it always leads to the optimisation of the fitness measure. If the context (or environment) where
the individual is contained is constant, then natural selection can indeed lead to fully rational and op-
timal choices. However, these are exceptional scenarios. Throughout time, environments keep chang-
ing and individuals are required to adapt in order to optimise their fitness measure and to survive.
Under a constant change of context and environment, individuals might be more susceptible to fall
under cognitive bias and apply rules of thumb and heuristics that can help them get the decision
outcome taking into considerations the limitations in knowledge regarding the new environmental
context, limitations in computational power and limitations in time. Ultimately, individuals are not
being irrational, but rather rational given all these constraints. In economics, cognition and other
disciplines, this behaviour is seen as purely irrational, since it is violating the axioms of expected
utility theory.
The question that now arises is whether there is a mathematical theory that is suitable to mode
these cognitive biases and violations to the axioms of expected utility in a more general and elegant
way that could be used across different fields that analyse cognition and decision-making through
different perspectives. We suggest that the answer to this question is positive and that the answer
can be pointed towards the mathematical formalisms of quantum mechanics.
4 Quantum Cognition
Motivated by cognitive biases identified by Tversky and Kahnman, researchers started to look for
alternative mathematical representations in order to accommodate these violations (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974, 1986; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Tversky and Shafir, 1992). Although in the
40’s, Niels Bohr had defended and was convinced that the general notions of quantum mechanics could
be applied in fields outside of physics (Murdoch, 1989), it was not until the 1990’s that researchers
started to actually apply the formalisms of quantum mechanics to problems concerned with social
sciences. It was the pioneering work of Aerts and Aerts (1994) that gave rise to the field Quantum
Cognition. In their work, Aerts and Aerts (1994) designed a quantum machine that was able to
represent the evolution from a quantum structure to a classical one, depending on the degree of
knowledge regarding the decision scenario. The authors also made several experiments to test the
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variation of probabilities when posing yes / no questions. According to the authors, the experiment
suggested that when participants did not have a predefined answer regarding a question, then the
answer would be updated at the moment the question was asked, indicating that the answer is highly
contextual. In other words, the answer is formed by the interaction between the participant and
the person asking the question. This deviates from classical statistics, because the answer is not
dependent on the participant’s beliefs. A further discussion about this study can be found in the
works of (Aerts, 1995, 1996, 1998; Gabora and Aerts, 2002; Aerts et al., 2011).
Quantum cognition has emerged as a research field that aims to build cognitive models using the
mathematical principles of quantum mechanics. Given that classical probability theory is very rigid
in the sense that it poses many constraints and assumptions (single trajectory principle, obeys set
theory, etc.), it becomes too limited (or even impossible) to provide simple models that can capture
human judgments and decisions since people are constantly violating the laws of logic and probability
theory (Busemeyer, 2015; Busemeyer and Wang, 2014; Aerts, 2014).
Following the lines of thought of Sloman (2014), people have to deal with missing / unknown
information. This lack of information can be translated into the feelings of ambiguity, uncertainty,
vagueness, risk, ignorance, etc (Zadeh, 2006), and each of them may require different mathematical
approaches to build adequate cognitive / decision problems. Quantum probability theory can be seen
as an alternative mathematical approach to model such cognitive phenomena.
The heart of quantum cognition is to use concepts of quantum mechanics such as superposition and
quantum interference effects in order to accommodate the paradoxical findings found in the literature.
For instance, in quantum information processing, information is modelled via wave functions and
therefore they cannot be in definite states. Instead, they are in an indefinite quantum state called the
superposition state. That is, all beliefs are occurring on the human mind at the same time, instead
of the classical approach which considers that each belief occurs in each time frame. According to
cognitive scientists, this effect is responsible for making people experience uncertainties, ambiguities
or even confusion before making a decision. At each moment, one belief can be more favoured than
another, but all beliefs are available at the same time. In this sense, quantum theory enables the
modelling of the cognitive system as if it was a wave moving across time over a state space until a
final decision is made. From this superposition state, uncertainty can produce different waves coming
from opposite directions that can crash into each other, causing an interference distribution. This
phenomena called quantum interference effects is the heart of quantum cognition and it can never be
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obtained in a classical setting. When the final decision is made, then there is no more uncertainty.
The wave collapses into a definite state. Thus, quantum information processing deals with both
definite and indefinite states (Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012). Figure 2 shows an example of quantum
superposition and quantum interference effects.
Fig. 2. Example of quantum superposition and quantum interference effects. Human beliefs are seen as
indefinite states that are occuring in the human mind at the same time. If we model these beliefs as waves
that propagate, then tehy can interfere with each other thourgh quantum interference effects leading to
different decision outcomes.
Some researchers argue that quantum-like models do not offer many underlying aspects of human
cognition (like perception, reasoning, etc). They are merely mathematical models used to fit data and
for this reason they are able to accommodate many paradoxical findings (Lee and Vanpaemel, 2013).
Indeed quantum-like models provide a more general probability theory that use quantum interfer-
ence effects to model decision scenarios, however they are also consistent with other psychological
phenomena (for instance, order effects) (Sloman, 2014). In the book of Busemeyer and Bruza (2012),
for instance, the feeling of uncertainty or ambiguity can be associated to quantum superpositions,
in which assumes that all beliefs of a person occur simultaneously, instead of the classical approach
which considers that each belief occurs in each time frame.
The non-commutative nature of quantum probability theory enables the exploration of methods
capable of explaining violations in order of effects. Order of effects is a fallacy that consists in
querying a person in one order and then posing the same questions in reverse order. Through classical
probability theory, it would be expected that a person would give the same answers independently of
the order of the questions. However, empirical findings show that this is not the case and that people
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are influence by the context of the previous questions. Moreover, the existence of quantum interference
effects also enables the exploration of models that accommodate other typed of paradoxical findings
such as disjunction and conjunction errors (Tversky and Shafir, 1992; Tversky and Kahneman, 1983).
In summary, quantum probability theory is a general framework, which can naturally explain various
decision-making paradoxes without falling into the restrictions of classical probability theory.
There are many quantum-like models proposed in the literature (Aerts et al., 2013b,a; Pothos and
Busemeyer, 2009; Busemeyer et al., 2006b; Khrennikov, 2010; Yukalov and Sornette, 2011). For the
purposes of this paper, we will present a model that is based on modularity. Like it was presented,
both humans and non-humans have limited computation and information processing capabilities.
In order to reason about something, one needs to combine small pieces of information in order to
make a decision about it (Griffiths et al., 2008). One model that can represent this modularity is the
Quantum-Like Bayesian Network originally proposed by Moreira and Wichert (2014, 2016).
5 Modularity and Quantum-Like Bayesian Networks for Decision-Making
Bayesian Networks are one of the most powerful structures known by the Computer Science com-
munity for deriving probabilistic inferences (for instance, in medical diagnosis, spam filtering, image
segmentation, etc) (Koller and Friedman, 2009). They provide a link between probability theory
and graph theory. And a fundamental property of graph theory is its modularity: one can build a
complex system by combining smaller and simpler parts. It is easier for a person to combine pieces
of evidence and to reason about them, instead of calculating all possible events and their respective
beliefs (Griffiths et al., 2008). In the same way, Bayesian Networks represent the decision problem in
small modules that can be combined to perform inferences. Only the probabilities which are actually
needed to perform the inferences are computed.
This process can resemble human cognition (Griffiths et al., 2008). While reasoning, humans
cannot process all possible information, because of their limited capacity. Consequently, they combine
several smaller pieces of evidence in order to reach a final decision.
5.1 Bayesian Networks
A classical Bayesian Network can be defined by a directed acyclic graph structure in which each
node represents a different random variable from a specific domain and each edge represents a direct
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influence from the source node to the target node. The graph represents independence relationships
between variables and each node is associated with a conditional probability table which specifies a
distribution over the values of a node given each possible joint assignment of values of its parents.
This idea of a node, depending directly from its parent nodes, is the core of Bayesian Networks. Once
the values of the parents are known, no information relating directly or indirectly to its parents or
other ancestors can influence the beliefs about it (Koller and Friedman, 2009). Figure 3, shows the
representation of a Bayesian Network.
Fig. 3. Example of classical Bayesian network with two random variables (nodes).
Bayesian Networks are based on probabilities. Probability theory is a formal framework that is
capable of representing multiple outcomes and their likelihoods under uncertainty. Uncertainty is
a consequence of various factors: limitations in our ability to observe the world, limitations in our
ability to model it and possibly even because of innate nondeterminism (Koller and Friedman, 2009).
If we take into account the basic structures behind probabilistic systems, we will find that in one
extreme there is the full joint probability distribution and in another extreme there is the Na¨ıve
Bayes model.
The full joint probability distribution corresponds to the entire knowledge of a system. That is,
it represents the probabilities of all possible atomic events in a domain. However, this explicit rep-
resentation of probability distributions is a highly demanding process and most of the times such
information is not possible to obtain as a full. Even in its simplest case, when N variables of a distri-
bution contain binary values, one would need to compute 2N entries. Under a computational point
of view, the manipulation of this distribution is a heavy and expensive process and the probability
distribution tables become too large to be stored in memory.
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In the other extreme, there is the Na¨ıve Bayes model. Reasoning about any realistic domain
always requires that some simplifications are made. The very act of preparing knowledge to support
reasoning requires that we leave many facts unknown, unsaid or crudely summarised. The Na¨ıve
Bayes model assumes that all random variables are independent of each other given a class. This
strong independence assumption greatly reduces the computational costs when compared to full
joint probability distribution. However, the independence assumption rarely holds when it comes to
modelling real world events, leading to more inaccurate models.
Bayesian Networks can be seen as a framework that falls between the full joint probability dis-
tribution and the Na¨ıve Bayes Model. It is a compact representation of high dimensional probability
distributions by combining conditional parameterisations with conditional independences in graph
structures (Koller and Friedman, 2009).
A Bayesian Network can be understood as the representation of a full joint probability distribution
through conditional independence statements. This way, a Bayesian Network can be used to answer
any query about the domain by combining (adding) all relevant entries from the joint probability.
5.2 Quantum-Like Bayesian Networks
In the work of (Moreira and Wichert, 2014, 2016), the authors suggest to define the Quantum-Like
Bayesian Network by replacing real probability numbers by quantum probability amplitudes, which
are complex numbers.
Fig. 4. Example of a quantum-like Bayesian network producing quantum interference effects when random
variables B and C are not observed.
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A complex number is a number that can be expressed in the form z = a+ ib, where a and b are
real numbers and i corresponds to the imaginary part, such that i2 = −1. Alternatively, a complex
number can be described in the form z = |r| eiθ, where |r| = √a2 + b2. The eiθ term is defined as
the phase of the amplitude and corresponds to the angle between the point expressed by (a, b) and
the origin of the plane. These amplitudes are related to classical probability by taking the squared
magnitude of these amplitudes through Born’s rule.
The general idea of a Quantum-Like Bayesian network is that when performing probabilistic in-
ference, the probability amplitude of each assignment of the network is propagated and influences the
probabilities of the remaining nodes. In other words, every assignment of every node of the network
is propagated until the node representing the query variable is reached. Note that, by taking multiple
assignments and paths at the same time, these trails influence each other producing interference
effects. If a node (or a random variable) is not observed, then it remains in a superposition state and
it can create quantum interference effects that can be used to accommodate the several paradoxical
findings in the literature. Figure 4 shows the underlying idea of the quantum-like Bayesian Network.
Recent research shows that quantum interference effects can serve as a fitting function that
enables an extra parametric fitting layer when compared with the classical model. Very generally, a
probabilistic inference on a quantum-like Bayesian network with two nodes A and B, expressed as
probability amplitudes as ψA and ψB = respectively, is given by
Pr(B) = |ψA|2 + |ψB |2 + 2ψAψB cos (θA − θB) ,
where θA and θB are the quantum interference parameters. Figure 5 shows all possible quantum
interference effects that can emerge from the Prisoner’s Dilemma experiment proposed by Li and
Taplin (2002) and Busemeyer et al. (2006a) in order to identify disjunction errors. Note that a
disjunction error corresponds to the judgment of two events to be least as likely as either of those
events (Carlson and Yates, 1989). This way, by choosing the right interference term, one can explain
the human cognitive bias and even predict human rationally bounded decisions.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we made a review of how different fields of the literature deal with the concept of
rationality.
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Fig. 5. Example of all possible quantum interference effects under the Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments made
by (Li and Taplin, 2002) and (Busemeyer et al., 2006a). In the figures, it is shown the estimation of the
quantum interference terms (Probability Computed) thourgh an heuristic function proposed in (Moreira and
Wichert, 2016) and the probability outcome of the participants observed in the experiments (Probability Ob-
served).
Since the axiomatization of the expected utility theory, it has been assumed that humans make
optimal decisions, always choosing the preference or the decision that leads to higher gains or higher
profits. Every decision that does not maximise this utility is considered irrational and not optimal.
Studies from the last decades show that humans constantly violate the axioms of expected utility
theory and now, evolutionary biology and ecological studies also demonstrate that humans are not
alone is this subject: both humans and non-humans systematically deviate from what rational choice
predicts. If the cognitive bias is shared between humans and non-humans, then it means that we
share an ancient and primordial set of heuristics and rules of thumb that helped us in the surviving
process of the species.
From the evolutionary Biology perspective, natural selection plays a role in finding the optimal
fitness measure. By fitness, we mean the capacity of an individual reproducing and surviving. If an
individual remains in a constant environment, then the cognitive abilities will be optimised and indeed
they can lead to fully optimal and rational decisions. But these scenarios are scarce. Environment
is constantly changing and individuals need to adapt to this change. Given that individuals have
limited processing power and limited time, they need to take actions with the limited information
that they have. They can use cognitive biases to speed up these decisions. Although they are not
fully optimal, they are the best that they can take given the constraints of time, knowledge and
computational power. So, under an evolutionary point of view, individuals are rationally bounded,
while in disciplines such as economics or cognitive science, these types of decisions are seen irrational.
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We ended this paper by introducing quantum mechanics as a general mathematical approach that
could take into account quantum superpositions and quantum interference effects to model, explain
and predict cognitive biases. We presented a network based model that has been widely studied in
the literature that combines small pieces of information in order to perform more complex inferences.
To conclude, there are many disciplines that have large contributions over the topic of rationality
and how cognitive biases can be explained through different perspectives. If one wants to model a
unified theory of decision-making, one needs to start having a holistic view of the subject in order to
produce more robust and more predictive models for decision-making.
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